"Early in the morning I was awakened by the thunderous sound of aircraft engines. As I crept out from under my tank I saw the first bomber waves approaching. From this moment on our concentration area was subject to air bombardment which lasted for two and a half hours without interruption. We were located in the very same part as the bombardment area. It was like hell and I am still astonished that I ever survived it. I was unconscious for a while after a bomb .had exploded just in front of my tank almost burying me alive. I could see that another tank about 30 metres away had received a direct hit which had set it on fire instantly. A third tank was turned upside down by the blast, and when I tell you that the tanks weighed 58 tons and were tossed aside like playing cards you will see just what a hell we found ourselves in. It was next to impossible to see anything as so much dirt had been stirred up by the explosions. It was like being in a very thick fog. It was impossible to hear anything because of the unceasing crashing of explosions around us. It was as if we were deaf. It was so nerve-shattering that we could not even think. All one could say to oneself was 'Will there never be an end ,to these explosions'. After two and a half hours the air bombardment stopped suddenly and the following silence was uncanny. As far as my Company was concerned two turrets were completely neutralized, two others were so badly damaged that they couldn't be employed. All the tanks were completely covered with earth and the gun turrets had been torn,completely out of adjustment by the shock effect. Fifty men of the Company were dead, two soldiers had committed suicide during the bombardment, another had to be sent to a mental hospital for observation. The psychological shock of these terrible experiences remained with us for a long time'.
'It had been the heaviest air bombardment in support of a ground attack ever mounted to that date and it was hoped that any enemy 'in the path of the armour would have been effectively neutralized. It was to be followed by the artillery barrage behind which the 11 th Armoured Division would advance. At 0745 hours the artillery opened up. Tank crews had strict orders to be in their tanks but these were not completely obeyed and a few short fall rounds falling among the 1eading tanks killed two of the Regiment. We then set off as close behind the barrage as we could. We had been ,told to keep within 100 yards of the barrage. Soon we came across our first enemy. 'J1hey were dazed, demoralized and they came out from cornfields attempting to surrender to the nearest tanks. By this time the dust, smoke and bom:b craters were making control of the squadron more difficult and slowed our advance somewhat. However, I was able to open up the squadron to cover a frontage of about 500 yards. We saw a few enemy in the orchards to our front and in the bushes and trees on our right flank, and I gave instruotions to my right-hand troops to shoot up the forward edge of the orchard and the trees whilst on the move. When we came to ;t;he orchard T oould see the German anti-tank gunners lying in their trenches or beside their guns completely dazed and taking no interest in the proceedings. ' We are talking then about men who as the Duke of Wellington's gunner officer, Capt Mercer, put it, 'fled not bodily, to he sure, but spiritually, becausf their senses seemed to have left them'.
We call it 'battleshock'. By 'battleshock' we mean inability to fight whioh does not result from major physical injury or disease. Brig El Sudany El Rayes, a senior psychiatrist in the Egyptian army feels that, despite their diverse forms, it is logica;l to describe under one heading conditions which have a common aetioffiogy in the un~que ciroumstances of battle; affecting for the mo~t part stable individuals; and which require similar management, namely early intervenmon, in :the baittle zone, wi:th the expectation df rap'1d return to duty. This must have a familiar ring to students of the subject of breakdown in battle in the two world wars. But the consensus following the 1973 Middle East war, held by many to represent on a limited scale much of What a major land battle in central Europe would be like, is that the prinoiples of successful management of battle shock are as valid today as When they were first discovered in the 1914-1918 war. Equally valid is the yardstick by which we can predict the number of battle shock cases reaching the medical organization in any given sector at any given time. That yaJ1ds i tick is t:he number of wounded in action whioh in turn reflects the intensity of the battle. We also need to remind ourselves of the staggering total number of troops Who are temporarily incapacitated in this way during fierce fighting. For example the 6th United States Marine Division lost 2,662 wounded in 10 days intensive action which also generate,d 1,287 psychiatric casualties. Between July and September 1944 the ratio of battleshock to wounded in the British Second Army in Northern France also reached over 20%. How often do we include 30% of battleshock cases amongst our simulated casualties during military exercises?
Are we to suppose that if we were attacked without warning by an enemy capable of launching a massive onslaught without overt preparation (enabling surprise to be total since distinguishing between an exercise, a feint, and an a!ll-out attack, can be a conundrum soluble only when it is too late), an enemy with overwhelming superiority in numbers of men, planes and missiles, that the percentage of battJlesihook oases would be less rt:han in WorLd War II? This potential enemy believes in initial surprise, concentration of artillery, close air support, speed of manoeuvre and deep penetration with disruption of supply lines, conVinuous operations round-the-clock made possible by inf11a-red and other imagiilg systems (but can replace his own tired and battered units by fresh ones), and a'lso believes in the aggressive use of electronic, chemical and tactical nuclear weapons and, let us not forget, rumour. Are we to believe that the consequent terror and turmoil, the relentless hammering, the loss of friends being killed and injured on all sides, the frustration of no:t being able to fight back effectively, the isolation, exhaustion and despair, will result in fewer men so afflicted? If we include in the number who run away those who flee 'spiritually' as well as those Who flee 'bodily' then General Hackett may well be right that they will determine the outcome of the battle.
Why then are ,we so inl prttJared to deal with bruttleshock? 18 i,t that we have been lulled into a false sense of security by the figures arising in the quite different circumstances of our respective experiences dn, let us say, Aden, or Vietnam? Or do we .rely on the hope that ,the need to 'fight in Europe win not arise. Few who have read the already mentioned fictional 'future history' of the third world war with its prophetic 6th chapter on 'Unrest in Poland'2, and have been aware of the factual invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 by 85,000 Russians, can doubt that the Warsaw Pact has the ability, could have the motive, and would have the will to attack the West. The only thing that will ever be in doubt will be their intention.
Or do we suppose that our battleshock victims merely ride along .the evacuation trail with their traumatized fellows? Not only is that a recipe for turning battleshock into chronic psychiatric disorder, as has been shown over and over again this century (most recently in Nigeria and. Israel), but it is also an invitation to other weary and disheartened soldiers to find a legitimate way out of their ordeal be developing the 'evacuation syndrome' which has cropped up in so many forms in twentieth century warfare, from the epidemics of respiratory symptoms following a brief experience of gas in World War I, to the epidemic sleepwalking affecting soldiers in Vietnam. (The latter was, I believe, cured by purtting the sufferers on guard duty at night until the condition subsided). The management of the battalions of battleshocked, and the streams of surgical stretcher cases who can no longer contribute to the cause, must be radically different, and the training and organization of field medical units must take account of these differences.
Another argument for doing nothing often heard is the statement 'it will an be over so quiokly that Ithe problem of batrtleshock is irrelevant'. Many charts have been drawn showing peaks and troughs of World War 11 casualty figures reflecting the fluctuating intensity of combat, and the chart for battleshock corresponding closely to 'the chart for trauma, with the battles hock lagging slightly behind, principally no doubt because of the lower movement priority accorded to such cases. This chart (Fig I) from the 1973 Middle East War shows the same pa~tern. Not only do we see the numbers of battleshock matching those of itrauma but it iHustrates 'lhe major lesson of that war; that the peuk incidence of battleshock was in thefir,S!t few days. Gone is the notion of ba:ttle 'exhaustion' developing after protracted exposure to the ordeals and terrors of modern warfare. The shock can occur on day one. A secondary lesson suggested by Levav and his co-workers 3 is that 'a critical period of up to one week for the treatment of combat reactions established a dividing line between good anp poor outcome' and 'it would be advisable to add other criterion, brevity, to the three already well established in the literature -immediacy, proximi'ty and expeotancy -to assure s,atisfaotory outcome'. It thus becomes 'apparent that a battle intensive enough to be over quickly can also be so intense that it generates battleshock rapidly enough for the victims to be incapacitated, to recover and to return to fight before such an ultra-short war is over. We have already seen that we are talking about very large numbers of fighting men rendered ineffective by ibattleshook, suffioient, in a war with many killed and wounded as ,weLt, to affect the outcome of the battle. But what if we win even half of the battleshocked back, to carry on at ~east for a few days -we would then add a rider to Hackett's dictum. "The result of a land battle is determined by the ..
.:
Training for Battle Shock number 01£ people rwhorun away (bodily and spiniitually) and by the number of those who can be enabled to return to the fray." In battle, iadies and gentlemen, psychiatry is concemed with reinfarcement. We are talking 'Of the equivalent of a whale brigade per carps.
Solutions Prevention
The best remedy lis preventlian and the surest is peace, but since we 'cannat always ,caunrt on It'hat we must look at other preventive measures.
Selecrion
Much has been said abaut the hapelessness 'Of eliminating battleshack by selectian. This view derives ifram sources ranging fram anecdates 'Of 'neurotics' wha showed incredible toughness in cambat and 'taugh guys' wha cmdked under apparently minimal stress, ta statistical studies 'Of whale armies in Warld War n.
Prafessar Rachman's4 study of British bamb disposal men wha have been successful in their wark despite being virtually unselected far the task tends ta bear this aut. Indeed the mare 'Ordinary these men were in terms 'Of their psychalagical profile the mare likely 'they were ta gain an award for gallantry. They were nat self-selected. The majarity when they jained the 'Ordnance branch fram which the bamb dispasal men were drawn did nat knaw that they wauld be expected ta carry aut this wark. However, one has to concede that some elementary selectian was at work in the formatian of the ordnance branch itself. If the men were criminal, illiterate, knawn psychatics, alcohalics 'Or drug abusers they would nat have been there in the first place. "Reverse selectian" of caurse consists in eliminating from the Service those who develop such gross and continuing mental or behavioural disorders, especially those who may infect others. If a man cannot cope with life without massive recourse to drugs how can he cope with battle?
"Reverse selec~ion", rigorously carried out, may engender fears of having too slim an army. In practice 'the drain on numbers is offset by increasing pride tin their professionalism 'by the remainder, by an increased desire to belong or join when rhe entire army becomes a corps d'elite. This disapprobation of the group is then a powerful sanotion against an erring individual which is expressed ultimately by 'expulsion, and ,dis(iipline and morale are hicgh. TbJis does notdf ,course aJbsdlve politicians, and the societies they represent, from the obligation to sustain the men and women who serve 'them. The contempt of the community at home or the need to rely on social security are hardly likely ,to encourage the best to enlist 'and serv'e on in a free society. Too IOften money is devoted to complex and expensive equipment which is rendered useless When atbandoned or misused by its bewildered operator, or is simply not used at all when his hand freezes on the trigger. People are 'Our prime resource and must be our !first pruority. In the end i,t is the quality not the quantity, of people and n:otequipment, whiich will deteJ1mine the outcome, or be~ter sW'! prevent ,the outbmak, of a land ibattle.
Cohesion
It is becoming axiomatic that the strongest bulwark against battleshock is group cohesion. By the same token integration into a cohesive group is a sine qua non !ror maiintenance of recovery fmm 'battles hock. In 'rhe Soviet Army g110up cohesion is achieved through the company political officer developing common attitudes, and we would probably all agree that leadership plays a part, but most of all it is achieved by shared experience. The ancient Bantu went through lIfe from the age of six or seven in a group called an Nj:tanga which herded cattle toge~her, played together, fought together, went through ceremonies together. We on the other hand move individuals from unit to unit in peacetime, replacing others 'in turn, and rely on piecemeal reinforcements in war with little hope of the individuals concerned being able to integrate rapidly enough into a cohesive group.
Organization, therefore, can create the conditions for 'cohesion to develop. Arduous training accelerates the process, the shared first experience of battle sets the seal.
If it was circumstances not selection which made heroes of the bomb disposers, it was training ithat enabled 'them to do it. Most of this was achieved during their training course, but disposing of the first successful real explosive device represented for 'the individual a watershed in his training and confidencebuilding from which he never looked back.
Hardening
Arduous military training has four main aims: It expands ,the boundaries of a man's accomplishment giving him both satisfaction and confidence.
ii. By rehearsing his tasks over and over again under the testing circumstance of wearing full NBC protective clothing, of sleeplessness, of not knowing when (or whether) the exercise will end, the probability that he can function automatically in the supreme test of battle is increased. iii. It enhances group cohesion not only because sharing an ordeal binds people together, but also more specifically 'in the case of NBC clothing, because unless soldiers learn to overcome the barriers to personal communication and even mutual identification imposed by those unearthly suits the basis on which cohesion actually works is destroyed. iv. It toughens a man's ability to face particular stresses, such as bombardment. In this connection we may expose a man to fear during parachuting, rock climbing or 'live firing, but how often does a man see dead or dismembered soldiers, even in simulation or on close-up film of rear' accidents? Isn't this also part of training for battleshbck?
Treatment
A growing number of army doctors, even some with lengthy service, will not have encountered battleshock and will have only a hazy idea of the ways in which it presents. The following examples taken from a 1944 training film give some indication of what we are talking about.
{11here fOlHorwed a seven minute extract fI10m "Field Psychiatry for iVhe MO"). Personnel with experience in clwn'ica:l psych~atry are surpl1isedoo disoover how quickly deeply shocked soldiers recover. Teams newly eXPQsed to combart casuallties tend to err on the pessimiSl1Jic side. They also dislcQver the ~mpossibility of predicting outcome reliiably at the first encounter.
First aid
The standard procedure for all battleshock cases is :
1.
Retention as near as possible 110 the man's unit location consistent with removal from the worst effects of the battle.
11.
An 'Jnitial pedod df reSit. The entire 27th 'Regiment of Foot, the Inniskillins,Silept dUl1ing the beginning lof 'the Battle of Waterloo at the rear 'of ~he battleground, 'three quarters of a mile behind the front line (which may have helped them subsequently (10 take the heaviest casualties from artillery as they stood for Ithe next four hours in the forefront of the Ibattle without giving ground: 450 out of 750 officers and men were k!illed or wounded)5. ilL Treatment as a soldier not as a pa1lient. iv. Work, which can be IQf value to a hard pressed medical unit coping with a flow of ,casuaikies genera!ted by the same !intensive battle whioh produced the batdesihock. v. Rapid return to duty j,f poss~ble to his original unit, or iJf not with a small group of others to another unlit.
Maybe half will not fulfil the expectation of recovery at !the first medica[ location but ,the process can be repearted at the next and some more will make it.
Medication
You will notice that the treatment outlined above does not ~nclude medication other than with the umversal remedies of Itea, ,ooffee and tobaoco. Some would argue that In a chaotic fast moving war in which medical staff are swamped withoasualties one cannot afllord ito turn a man who can at least move, and wiJil soon care for himself and others, into a stmtcher case who would then, like aB stretcher cases, lbeoome a df3Jin on resources instead of :a contdbutor to them.
Nor lcan one afford to remove the last vestige ofoontrol from an ovel1wrought individual by diis~~nlribilting drugs. 'I1he majority of battleshock cases are subdued, not overactive, and only a few of the latter type will fail to respond to firm handling. (This is worth mmembering by :the way when briefing exeroise battleshook casualVieswho in the past have tended 1J0 be represented by a single loonspicuous disruptive idiot). If psychotrophic medication is deemed imperative, halopeJ4idol , is the drug of choice.
Aetiological factors
ConsideratIDon of aetioJogy suggests refinements of treatment.
Fear -A large number of hattleshook cases are explicable in terms of rear, expressed by a sympathetic ov,eractivity Ibeyond that which is inevitable ~n battle and compaIJiJb1e wi'~h oontinued 'effeotiveness. Such cases are reoognizable, and <in theory susceptible ,to. management by behaviour-Itherapy. l1his usually involves temporary removal fl10mthe overwhelming stress, reassertion of rhe soldier'S oontrol, his deoorminauron to overoome his ,crippling reaction, mental rehearsal of the traumatic events with group support, and finally aotual re-exposure to the original stress.
Fugue -'This can be ,seen as a cerebml ,rather than somatic 'response ,to ovel1whelming fear ~n whidh I~he memory of the experience is so painful that, along with a good deal of the scYldier's awareness of the outside world, it is excluded from consciousness. Abreaction, iuhat is mental recreation of the traumalt!ic experiences together with th~ir ifurNemotional aocompaniment, is a weU-ttiied Itherapeutic techniique oftenaJpplied in such cases.
Conversion -A :SlillaII number are driven hy tJheir fear illvo the l'Oss 'Of s'Ome faculty sUJoh as the 'Use cYf a Ihand or, in its suhtler form,t!o be unduly linoapadtated by minor ,trauma or illness. The jmportaJntfirst step here lis recogniti'On of l1!he condition by the ollinidian; to be followed dwing a 1!emporary respite from the prec~piitating sltresses by recovery aided by suggestion; and eventually recogniltion of the oondition by the sufferer. Incidentally shooting, or thethrea!t of it, lis a method of suggesti'on 'Often tJiied, particularly for those Iwho have opted out of the bai1Jcle in a more obV'ious way hy drug abuse 'Or desertion. It has, however, neV'er really been sholW1l to succeed in promoting t/Jorti1Jude, as opposed to preventing flight, and it is certain that those shot wihl not renew the fight against the enemy.
Bereavement -I would like ItO suggest, bearing in mind the firs,t example in rt:he film. which represents 'One of ,the commoner forms of Ibattleshock, that the role of bereavement in generating depressiv'e rewdtJions is undel1es 1 timated. The ~undamental fwdt is .1!hait balttleshoc'k OCCUl' lS . When dea1!h and mutilation are imminent. It lis assumed UiIlIfalirly th<lJtthis ~mpHes ,thait the sufferer merely fears his own exilinc~ion. But surely in a truly odhesive unlit there is also ineviitaibly loss of dose companions? In ev·er~ay life lOne may adjust to this in tI. day or two. In battle '~e adjustment has to be made pel1haps several times in a day and without a dhance to fulfil the hUman need to mourn. The corollary Of thlis ~s that1!here is a case £or emp~oying guided mourning in treatment, as described by Mawson and his co-iWol1k!ers 6 , as rwell as, in some 'cases, electra-convulsIve therapy.
Endorphins -lit has been suggested that ~ol'lffiation rof morphine-like substance, endorphiins, in the central nervous sysltem inresrponse ,to stJ1ess, resU!1Ving in prolonged inMbition OIf ONSaotiyi~ty ~for minutes or hours,rather than the more usual miillliseconds or seconds !of inhibition engendered by neuro-transmitters) may explain what bJappens lin at least some leases iOf baJttleshock, and account for those anecdotes in rwlhich 'One officer remarks to and~her "~ou seem to have lost your leg. Slir" to which the other replies '"By jove, S~r, so I have". If thlis model is oorrect there are seveml implicati~ons: It can happen to the most stJallwavt, it is striJo1Jly temporary and ,will disappeall" IsporntJaneously in ,the absence of continuing extreme stress, and may even be susceptible to specific parenteral treatment.
Organization
There is no reason why tfirsit aid and even the prinoiples of more specific treatment should not bea,prplied wi'thin the battaHon. In practice, ,though only sman numbers who respond readily can be dealt with in this way.
The first location at which casualties can be ,held for up to two days and managed by medical personnel will be a d[visional administrative area. Here must be located the first Batttileshtock RehaJbiliitartion Unit ~BRU) manned by a section of the medical battalion and supported by a Field Psychiatric Team (FPT).
Dr Shaibtai Noy7, a reserve 'Officer ,0£ :the IsrraeIi Defence Fol'loo, al'gues cogenlNy irom history aIlid the likely nature of a Central Buropean war that the DivisionaJl FPT will be swamped by a gush of casualtiies just when they are in a position to be most eff~ive in arresting the rearward flow and bringing about recovery and return to duty. He suggests deployment of mobile FPTs from the rear. Given the cha~c scenaI1io and communkaltion problems ,we aIie considering, a safer solUJtion 'is initial deployment of FPTs forwaro ,with the option of wi~dra'Wling them rearward subsequently. Even so there is still a need to have additional BRUs alongside the general hospitals in the rear combat zone to take the overflow, while still fulfilling the four criteria for successful outcome -immediacy, proximity, e:xpe'ctancy and brevity. Indeed, bearing in mind that rbattileshack cases will occur locally, wi'll be included willy lIilly in the casualty stream without any guarantee of immediate evacuation, and baftleshock will in any case affect a significant number of trauma cases (about 30% in one Israeli study) it is necesessary to have some psyohiatric support in every medical facility.
Role of the field psychiatric team
With l<iterally hundreds of ibattleshock cases held in BRUs, the psychiatric teams can hardly engage in formal behaviour therapy, much less analytical psyohotherapy. What they must do is reoogniize battlelshock cases and preV'ent their evacuation, assess and re-assess their progress ,towards return to dUlty or evenitual removal from the combat zone, have an eye open for the developmen~ of 'evacualtion syndromes' and inMiate or nominate ,therapy to be carried out by others, even by the balftleshooked themselves, such .as group recapitwalti'on of the even'ts of the recent Iblatitle.
Training
Is it not al)it late to be instructing soldiers after the battle has staI1ted? Should not every soldier be taught the elements of the management off battleshock together rwi1:h the main'tenance of airway and the arrest of haemorrhage as part of his basic training? Is there anything which I have said which cannot be understood by a layman?
If IOOmlbat troops require this training how much more do medical personnel, specialiist and non-spediallist, at 001 leViels, neoo to be versed in the prindilples and rehearsed in the pradtice df dealing with balttleshock. Unless in 'every exereise up to one ,third oil' ~he casualtJies, suitaNe briefed, represent the Iba;ttlesihocked element, how can either the army as a whole, both staff and rank and file, or the medical organiza1lUon, learn to accept and cope successfully wi>th this inescapalb1e aspect of intensiiv'e war?
Finally medical personnel themselves are not immune from battleshock, though being wlholly occupied w1tih casualties helps. Medical personnel too need those elements of hardening, over-learning of skiHs, increaSing confidence and cohesion induced Ibyarduous traiining.
Ladies and gentJIemen, by way oftrwin!ing :lior battleshockthere is much Ito be done.
